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1 первоночальный проект
Русско-английский авиационный словарь > первоночальный проект
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2 первоночальный проект
Русско-английский аэрокосмический словарь > первоночальный проект
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3 проект первоначальный
Русско-английский глоссарий по космической технике > проект первоначальный
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4 первоночальный проект
Авиация и космонавтика. Русско-английский словарь > первоночальный проект
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5 Wright, Frank Lloyd
SUBJECT AREA: Architecture and building[br]b. 8 June 1869 Richland Center, Wisconsin, USAd. 9 April 1959 Phoenix, Arizona, USA[br]American architect who, in an unparalleled career spanning almost seventy years, became the most important figure on the modern architectural scene both in his own country and far further afield.[br]Wright began his career in 1887 working in the Chicago offices of Adler \& Sullivan. He conceived a great admiration for Sullivan, who was then concentrating upon large commercial projects in modern mode, producing functional yet decorative buildings which took all possible advantage of new structural methods. Wright was responsible for many of the domestic commissions.In 1893 Wright left the firm in order to set up practice on his own, thus initiating a career which was to develop into three distinct phases. In the first of these, up until the First World War, he was chiefly designing houses in a concept in which he envisaged "the house as a shelter". These buildings displayed his deeply held opinion that detached houses in country areas should be designed as an integral part of the landscape, a view later to be evidenced strongly in the work of modern Finnish architects. Wright's designs were called "prairie houses" because so many of them were built in the MidWest of America, which Wright described as a "prairie". These were low and spreading, with gently sloping rooflines, very plain and clean lined, built of traditional materials in warm rural colours, blending softly into their settings. Typical was W.W.Willit's house of 1902 in Highland Park, Illinois.In the second phase of his career Wright began to build more extensively in modern materials, utilizing advanced means of construction. A notable example was his remarkable Imperial Hotel in Tokyo, carefully designed and built in 1916–22 (now demolished), with special foundations and structure to withstand (successfully) strong earthquake tremors. He also became interested in the possibilities of reinforced concrete; in 1906 he built his church at Oak Park, Illinois, entirely of this material. In the 1920s, in California, he abandoned his use of traditional materials for house building in favour of precast concrete blocks, which were intended to provide an "organic" continuity between structure and decorative surfacing. In his continued exploration of the possibilities of concrete as a building material, he created the dramatic concept of'Falling Water', a house built in 1935–7 at Bear Run in Pennsylvania in which he projected massive reinforced-concrete terraces cantilevered from a cliff over a waterfall in the woodlands. In the later 1930s an extraordinary run of original concepts came from Wright, then nearing 70 years of age, ranging from his own winter residence and studio, Taliesin West in Arizona, to the administration block for Johnson Wax (1936–9) in Racine, Wisconsin, where the main interior ceiling was supported by Minoan-style, inversely tapered concrete columns rising to spreading circular capitals which contained lighting tubes of Pyrex glass.Frank Lloyd Wright continued to work until four days before his death at the age of 91. One of his most important and certainly controversial commissions was the Solomon R.Guggenheim Museum in New York. This had been proposed in 1943 but was not finally built until 1956–9; in this striking design the museum's exhibition areas are ranged along a gradually mounting spiral ramp lit effectively from above. Controversy stemmed from the unusual and original design of exterior banding and interior descending spiral for wall-display of paintings: some critics strongly approved, while others, equally strongly, did not.[br]Principal Honours and DistinctionsRIBA Royal Gold Medal 1941.Bibliography1945, An Autobiography, Faber \& Faber.Further ReadingE.Kaufmann (ed.), 1957, Frank Lloyd Wright: an American Architect, New York: Horizon Press.H.Russell Hitchcock, 1973, In the Nature of Materials, New York: Da Capo.T.A.Heinz, 1982, Frank Lloyd Wright, New York: St Martin's.DY -
6 оригинальный
1. original2. originallyБизнес, юриспруденция. Русско-английский словарь > оригинальный
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7 с момента первого появления ... в
С момента первого появления... в (промышленности)-- Since its industrial debut some 15 years ago, the Olympus engine has now been transformed from its original aero military design concept to a highly successful industrial unit.Русско-английский научно-технический словарь переводчика > с момента первого появления ... в
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8 Bibliography
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The psychology of computer vision. New York: McGrawHill.■ Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.■ Wittgenstein, L. (1958). The blue and brown books. New York: Harper Colophon.■ Woods, W. A. (1975). What's in a link: Foundations for semantic networks. In D. G. Bobrow & A. Collins (Eds.), Representations and understanding: Studies in cognitive science (pp. 35-84). New York: Academic Press.■ Woodworth, R. S. (1938). Experimental psychology. New York: Holt; London: Methuen (1939).■ Wundt, W. (1904). Principles of physiological psychology (Vol. 1). E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.■ Wundt, W. (1907). Lectures on human and animal psychology. J. E. Creighton & E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.■ Young, J. Z. (1978). Programs of the brain. New York: Oxford University Press.■ Ziman, J. (1978). Reliable knowledge: An exploration of the grounds for belief in science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography
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9 Wren, Sir Christopher
SUBJECT AREA: Architecture and building[br]b. 20 October 1632 East Knoyle, Wiltshire, Englandd. 25 February 1723 London, England[br]English architect whose background in scientific research and achievement enhanced his handling of many near-intractable architectural problems.[br]Born into a High Church and Royalist family, the young Wren early showed outstanding intellectual ability and at Oxford in 1654 was described as "that miracle of a youth". Educated at Westminster School, he went up to Oxford, where he graduated at the age of 19 and obtained his master's degree two years later. From this time onwards his interests were in science, primarily astronomy but also physics, engineering and meteorology. While still at college he developed theories about and experimentally solved some fifty varied problems. At the age of 25 Wren was appointed to the Chair of Astronomy at Gresham College in London, but he soon returned to Oxford as Savilian Professor of Astronomy there. At the same time he became one of the founder members of the Society of Experimental Philosophy at Oxford, which was awarded its Royal Charter soon after the Restoration of 1660; Wren, together with such men as Isaac Newton, Robert Hooke, John Evelyn and Robert Boyle, then found himself a member of the Royal Society.Wren's architectural career began with the classical chapel that he built, at the request of his uncle, the Bishop of Ely, for Pembroke College, Cambridge (1663). From this time onwards, until he died at the age of 91, he was fully occupied with a wide and taxing variety of architectural problems which he faced in the execution of all the great building schemes of the day. His scientific background and inventive mind stood him in good stead in solving such difficulties with an often unusual approach and concept. Nowhere was this more apparent than in his rebuilding of fifty-one churches in the City of London after the Great Fire, in the construction of the new St Paul's Cathedral and in the grand layout of the Royal Hospital at Greenwich.The first instance of Wren's approach to constructional problems was in his building of the Sheldonian Theatre in Oxford (1664–9). He based his design upon that of the Roman Theatre of Marcellus (13–11 BC), which he had studied from drawings in Serlio's book of architecture. Wren's reputation as an architect was greatly enhanced by his solution to the roofing problem here. The original theatre in Rome, like all Roman-theatres, was a circular building open to the sky; this would be unsuitable in the climate of Oxford and Wren wished to cover the English counterpart without using supporting columns, which would have obscured the view of the stage. He solved this difficulty mathematically, with the aid of his colleague Dr Wallis, the Professor of Geometry, by means of a timber-trussed roof supporting a painted ceiling which represented the open sky.The City of London's churches were rebuilt over a period of nearly fifty years; the first to be completed and reopened was St Mary-at-Hill in 1676, and the last St Michael Cornhill in 1722, when Wren was 89. They had to be rebuilt upon the original medieval sites and they illustrate, perhaps more clearly than any other examples of Wren's work, the fertility of his imagination and his ability to solve the most intractable problems of site, limitation of space and variation in style and material. None of the churches is like any other. Of the varied sites, few are level or possess right-angled corners or parallel sides of equal length, and nearly all were hedged in by other, often larger, buildings. Nowhere is his versatility and inventiveness shown more clearly than in his designs for the steeples. There was no English precedent for a classical steeple, though he did draw upon the Dutch examples of the 1630s, because the London examples had been medieval, therefore Roman Catholic and Gothic, churches. Many of Wren's steeples are, therefore, Gothic steeples in classical dress, but many were of the greatest originality and delicate beauty: for example, St Mary-le-Bow in Cheapside; the "wedding cake" St Bride in Fleet Street; and the temple diminuendo concept of Christ Church in Newgate Street.In St Paul's Cathedral Wren showed his ingenuity in adapting the incongruous Royal Warrant Design of 1675. Among his gradual and successful amendments were the intriguing upper lighting of his two-storey choir and the supporting of the lantern by a brick cone inserted between the inner and outer dome shells. The layout of the Royal Hospital at Greenwich illustrates Wren's qualities as an overall large-scale planner and designer. His terms of reference insisted upon the incorporation of the earlier existing Queen's House, erected by Inigo Jones, and of John Webb's King Charles II block. The Queen's House, in particular, created a difficult problem as its smaller size rendered it out of scale with the newer structures. Wren's solution was to make it the focal centre of a great vista between the main flanking larger buildings; this was a masterstroke.[br]Principal Honours and DistinctionsKnighted 1673. President, Royal Society 1681–3. Member of Parliament 1685–7 and 1701–2. Surveyor, Greenwich Hospital 1696. Surveyor, Westminster Abbey 1699.Surveyor-General 1669–1712.Further ReadingR.Dutton, 1951, The Age of Wren, Batsford.M.Briggs, 1953, Wren the Incomparable, Allen \& Unwin. M.Whinney, 1971, Wren, Thames \& Hudson.K.Downes, 1971, Christopher Wren, Allen Lane.G.Beard, 1982, The Work of Sir Christopher Wren, Bartholomew.DY -
10 conception
conception [kɔ̃sεpsjɔ̃]feminine nouna. [d'enfant, projet] conception ; [de produit] designb. ( = idée) idea ; ( = réalisation) creation* * *kɔ̃sɛpsjɔ̃1) Biologie conception2) ( formulation d'idée) conception3) ( élaboration de la forme) design4) ( idée) idea; ( façon de voir) conception* * *kɔ̃sɛpsjɔ̃ nfconception, [machine] design* * *conception nf1 Biol conception;2 ( formulation d'idée) conception; la conception de l'œuvre a été lente it took a long time to conceive the work;3 ( élaboration de la forme) design; au stade de la conception at the design stage; voiture d'une conception révolutionnaire car with a revolutionary design;4 ( idée) idea; ( façon de voir) conception; elle a une conception bizarre de la fidélité she has a pretty odd conception ou idea of fidelity; ils ont une conception différente du mariage they don't share the same views on marriage, they have a different conception of marriage.conception assistée par ordinateur, CAO computer-aided design, CAD; conception et fabrication assistées par ordinateur, CFAO CAD-CAM; conception de programmes assistée par ordinateur, CPAO computer-aided software engineering, CASE.[kɔ̃sɛpsjɔ̃] nom féminin2. (littéraire) [compréhension] understanding4. [élaboration - généralement] design ; [ - par une entreprise] product design5. INFORMATIQUE -
11 Language
Philosophy is written in that great book, the universe, which is always open, right before our eyes. But one cannot understand this book without first learning to understand the language and to know the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other figures. Without these, one cannot understand a single word of it, and just wanders in a dark labyrinth. (Galileo, 1990, p. 232)It never happens that it [a nonhuman animal] arranges its speech in various ways in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 116)It is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same. (Descartes, 1967, p. 116)Human beings do not live in the object world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built on the language habits of the group.... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Sapir, 1921, p. 75)It powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes.... No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same worlds with different labels attached. (Sapir, 1985, p. 162)[A list of language games, not meant to be exhaustive:]Giving orders, and obeying them- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)Reporting an eventSpeculating about an eventForming and testing a hypothesisPresenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagramsMaking up a story; and reading itPlay actingSinging catchesGuessing riddlesMaking a joke; and telling itSolving a problem in practical arithmeticTranslating from one language into anotherLANGUAGE Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, and praying-. (Wittgenstein, 1953, Pt. I, No. 23, pp. 11 e-12 e)We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages.... The world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 153, 213-214)We dissect nature along the lines laid down by our native languages.The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar or can in some way be calibrated. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 213-214)9) The Forms of a Person's Thoughts Are Controlled by Unperceived Patterns of His Own LanguageThe forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language-shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. (Whorf, 1956, p. 252)It has come to be commonly held that many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts.... Many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake-the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite different. (Austin, 1962, pp. 2-3)In general, one might define a complex of semantic components connected by logical constants as a concept. The dictionary of a language is then a system of concepts in which a phonological form and certain syntactic and morphological characteristics are assigned to each concept. This system of concepts is structured by several types of relations. It is supplemented, furthermore, by redundancy or implicational rules..., representing general properties of the whole system of concepts.... At least a relevant part of these general rules is not bound to particular languages, but represents presumably universal structures of natural languages. They are not learned, but are rather a part of the human ability to acquire an arbitrary natural language. (Bierwisch, 1970, pp. 171-172)In studying the evolution of mind, we cannot guess to what extent there are physically possible alternatives to, say, transformational generative grammar, for an organism meeting certain other physical conditions characteristic of humans. Conceivably, there are none-or very few-in which case talk about evolution of the language capacity is beside the point. (Chomsky, 1972, p. 98)[It is] truth value rather than syntactic well-formedness that chiefly governs explicit verbal reinforcement by parents-which renders mildly paradoxical the fact that the usual product of such a training schedule is an adult whose speech is highly grammatical but not notably truthful. (R. O. Brown, 1973, p. 330)he conceptual base is responsible for formally representing the concepts underlying an utterance.... A given word in a language may or may not have one or more concepts underlying it.... On the sentential level, the utterances of a given language are encoded within a syntactic structure of that language. The basic construction of the sentential level is the sentence.The next highest level... is the conceptual level. We call the basic construction of this level the conceptualization. A conceptualization consists of concepts and certain relations among those concepts. We can consider that both levels exist at the same point in time and that for any unit on one level, some corresponding realizate exists on the other level. This realizate may be null or extremely complex.... Conceptualizations may relate to other conceptualizations by nesting or other specified relationships. (Schank, 1973, pp. 191-192)The mathematics of multi-dimensional interactive spaces and lattices, the projection of "computer behavior" on to possible models of cerebral functions, the theoretical and mechanical investigation of artificial intelligence, are producing a stream of sophisticated, often suggestive ideas.But it is, I believe, fair to say that nothing put forward until now in either theoretic design or mechanical mimicry comes even remotely in reach of the most rudimentary linguistic realities. (Steiner, 1975, p. 284)The step from the simple tool to the master tool, a tool to make tools (what we would now call a machine tool), seems to me indeed to parallel the final step to human language, which I call reconstitution. It expresses in a practical and social context the same understanding of hierarchy, and shows the same analysis by function as a basis for synthesis. (Bronowski, 1977, pp. 127-128)t is the language donn eґ in which we conduct our lives.... We have no other. And the danger is that formal linguistic models, in their loosely argued analogy with the axiomatic structure of the mathematical sciences, may block perception.... It is quite conceivable that, in language, continuous induction from simple, elemental units to more complex, realistic forms is not justified. The extent and formal "undecidability" of context-and every linguistic particle above the level of the phoneme is context-bound-may make it impossible, except in the most abstract, meta-linguistic sense, to pass from "pro-verbs," "kernals," or "deep deep structures" to actual speech. (Steiner, 1975, pp. 111-113)A higher-level formal language is an abstract machine. (Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 113)Jakobson sees metaphor and metonymy as the characteristic modes of binarily opposed polarities which between them underpin the two-fold process of selection and combination by which linguistic signs are formed.... Thus messages are constructed, as Saussure said, by a combination of a "horizontal" movement, which combines words together, and a "vertical" movement, which selects the particular words from the available inventory or "inner storehouse" of the language. The combinative (or syntagmatic) process manifests itself in contiguity (one word being placed next to another) and its mode is metonymic. The selective (or associative) process manifests itself in similarity (one word or concept being "like" another) and its mode is metaphoric. The "opposition" of metaphor and metonymy therefore may be said to represent in effect the essence of the total opposition between the synchronic mode of language (its immediate, coexistent, "vertical" relationships) and its diachronic mode (its sequential, successive, lineal progressive relationships). (Hawkes, 1977, pp. 77-78)It is striking that the layered structure that man has given to language constantly reappears in his analyses of nature. (Bronowski, 1977, p. 121)First, [an ideal intertheoretic reduction] provides us with a set of rules"correspondence rules" or "bridge laws," as the standard vernacular has it-which effect a mapping of the terms of the old theory (T o) onto a subset of the expressions of the new or reducing theory (T n). These rules guide the application of those selected expressions of T n in the following way: we are free to make singular applications of their correspondencerule doppelgangers in T o....Second, and equally important, a successful reduction ideally has the outcome that, under the term mapping effected by the correspondence rules, the central principles of T o (those of semantic and systematic importance) are mapped onto general sentences of T n that are theorems of Tn. (P. Churchland, 1979, p. 81)If non-linguistic factors must be included in grammar: beliefs, attitudes, etc. [this would] amount to a rejection of the initial idealization of language as an object of study. A priori such a move cannot be ruled out, but it must be empirically motivated. If it proves to be correct, I would conclude that language is a chaos that is not worth studying.... Note that the question is not whether beliefs or attitudes, and so on, play a role in linguistic behavior and linguistic judgments... [but rather] whether distinct cognitive structures can be identified, which interact in the real use of language and linguistic judgments, the grammatical system being one of these. (Chomsky, 1979, pp. 140, 152-153)23) Language Is Inevitably Influenced by Specific Contexts of Human InteractionLanguage cannot be studied in isolation from the investigation of "rationality." It cannot afford to neglect our everyday assumptions concerning the total behavior of a reasonable person.... An integrational linguistics must recognize that human beings inhabit a communicational space which is not neatly compartmentalized into language and nonlanguage.... It renounces in advance the possibility of setting up systems of forms and meanings which will "account for" a central core of linguistic behavior irrespective of the situation and communicational purposes involved. (Harris, 1981, p. 165)By innate [linguistic knowledge], Chomsky simply means "genetically programmed." He does not literally think that children are born with language in their heads ready to be spoken. He merely claims that a "blueprint is there, which is brought into use when the child reaches a certain point in her general development. With the help of this blueprint, she analyzes the language she hears around her more readily than she would if she were totally unprepared for the strange gabbling sounds which emerge from human mouths. (Aitchison, 1987, p. 31)Looking at ourselves from the computer viewpoint, we cannot avoid seeing that natural language is our most important "programming language." This means that a vast portion of our knowledge and activity is, for us, best communicated and understood in our natural language.... One could say that natural language was our first great original artifact and, since, as we increasingly realize, languages are machines, so natural language, with our brains to run it, was our primal invention of the universal computer. One could say this except for the sneaking suspicion that language isn't something we invented but something we became, not something we constructed but something in which we created, and recreated, ourselves. (Leiber, 1991, p. 8)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Language
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12 Gropius, Walter Adolf
SUBJECT AREA: Architecture and building[br]b. 18 May 1883 Berlin, Germanyd. 5 July 1969 Boston, USA[br]German co-founder of the modern movement of architecture.[br]A year after he began practice as an architect, Gropius was responsible for the pace-setting Fagus shoe-last factory at Alfeld-an-der-Leine in Germany, one of the few of his buildings to survive the Second World War. Today the building does not appear unusual, but in 1911 it was a revolutionary prototype, heralding the glass curtain walled method of non-load-bearing cladding that later became ubiquitous. Made from glass, steel and reinforced concrete, this factory initiated a new concept, that of the International school of modern architecture.In 1919 Gropius was appointed to head the new School of Art and Design at Weimar, the Staatliches Bauhaus. The school had been formed by an amalgamation of the Grand Ducal schools of fine and applied arts founded in 1906. Here Gropius put into practice his strongly held views and he was so successful that this small college, which trained only a few hundred students in the limited years of its existence, became world famous, attracting artists, architects and students of quality from all over Europe.Gropius's idea was to set up an institution where students of all the arts and crafts could work together and learn from one another. He abhorred the artificial barriers that had come to exist between artists and craftsmen and saw them all as interdependent. He felt that manual dexterity was as essential as creative design. Every Bauhaus student, whatever the individual's field of work or talent, took the same original workshop training. When qualified they were able to understand and supervise all the aesthetic and constructional processes that made up the scope of their work.In 1924, because of political changes, the Weimar Bauhaus was closed, but Gropius was invited to go to Dessau to re-establish it in a new purpose-built school which he designed. This group of buildings became a prototype that designers of the new architectural form emulated. Gropius left the Bauhaus in 1928, only a few years before it was finally closed due to the growth of National Socialism. He moved to England in 1934, but because of a lack of architectural opportunities and encouragement he continued on his way to the USA, where he headed the Department of Architecture at Harvard University's Graduate School of Design from 1937 to 1952. After his retirement from there Gropius formed the Architect's Collaborative and, working with other architects such as Marcel Breuer and Pietro Belluschi, designed a number of buildings (for example, the US Embassy in Athens (1960) and the Pan Am Building in New York (1963)).[br]Bibliography1984, Scope of Total Architecture, Allen \& Unwin.Further ReadingN.Pevsner, 1936, Pioneers of the Modern Movement: From William Morris to Walter Gropius, Penguin.C.Jenck, 1973, Modern Movements in Architecture, Penguin.H.Probst and C.Shädlich, 1988, Walter Gropius, Berlin: Ernst \& Son.DY -
13 Perret, Auguste
[br]b. 12 February 1874 Ixelles, near Brussels, Belgiumd. 26 February 1954 Le Havre (?), France[br]French architect who pioneered and established building design in reinforced concrete in a style suited to the modern movement.[br]Auguste Perret belonged to the family contracting firm of A. \& G.Perret, which early specialized in the use of reinforced concrete. His eight-storey building at 25 bis Rue Franklin in Paris, built in 1902–3, was the first example of frame construction in this material and established its viability for structural design. Both ground plan and façade are uncompromisingly modern, the simplicity of the latter being relieved by unobtrusive faience decoration. The two upper floors, which are set back, and the open terrace roof garden set a pattern for future schemes. All of Perret's buildings had reinforced-concrete structures and this was clearly delineated on the façade designs. The concept was uncommon in Europe at the time, when eclecticism still largely ruled, but was derived from the late nineteenth-century skyscraper façades built by Louis Sullivan in America. In 1905–6 came Perret's Garage Ponthieu in Paris; a striking example of exposed concrete, it had a central façade window glazed in modern design in rich colours. By the 1920s ferroconcrete was in more common use, but Perret still led the field in France with his imaginative, bold use of the material. His most original structure is the Church of Notre Dame at Le Raincy on the outskirts of Paris (1922–3). The imposing exterior with its tall tower in diminishing stages is finely designed, but the interior has magnificence. It is a wide, light church, the segmented vaulted roof supported on slender columns. The whole structure is in concrete apart from the glass window panels, which extend the full height of the walls all around the church. They provide a symphony of colour culminating in deep blue behind the altar. Because of the slenderness of the columns and the richness of the glass, this church possesses a spiritual atmosphere and unimpeded sight and sound of and from the altar for everyone. It became the prototype for churches all over Europe for decades, from Moser in prewar Switzerland to Spence's postwar Coventry Cathedral.In a long working life Perret designed buildings for a wide range of purposes, adhering to his preference for ferroconcrete and adapting its use according to each building's needs. In the 1940s he was responsible for the railway station at Amiens, the Atomic Centre at Saclay and, one of his last important works, the redevelopment after wartime damage of the town centre of Le Havre. For the latter, he laid out large open squares enclosed by prefabricated units, which display a certain monotony, despite the imposing town hall and Church of St Joseph in the Place de L'Hôtel de Ville.[br]Principal Honours and DistinctionsPresident des Réunions Internationales des Architectes. American Society of the French Legion of Honour Gold Medal 1950. Elected after the Second World War to the Institut de France. First President of the International Union of Architects on its creation in 1948. RIBA Royal Gold Medal 1948.Further ReadingP.Blater, 1939, "Work of the architect A.Perret", Architektura SSSR (Moscow) 7:57 (illustrated article).1848 "Auguste Perret: a pioneer in reinforced concrete", Civil Engineers' Review, pp.296–300.Peter Collins, 1959, Concrete: The Vision of a New Architecture: A Study of Auguste Perret and his Precursors, Faber \& Faber.Marcel Zahar, 1959, D'Une Doctrine d'Architecture: Auguste Perret, Paris: Vincent Fréal.DY -
14 Hopkinson, John
[br]b. 27 July 1849 Manchester, Englandd. 27 August 1898 Petite Dent de Veisivi, Switzerland[br]English mathematician and electrical engineer who laid the foundations of electrical machine design.[br]After attending Owens College, Manchester, Hopkinson was admitted to Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1867 to read for the Mathematical Tripos. An appointment in 1872 with the lighthouse department of the Chance Optical Works in Birmingham directed his attention to electrical engineering. His most noteworthy contribution to lighthouse engineering was an optical system to produce flashing lights that distinguished between individual beacons. His extensive researches on the dielectric properties of glass were recognized when he was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society at the age of 29. Moving to London in 1877 he became established as a consulting engineer at a time when electricity supply was about to begin on a commercial scale. During the remainder of his life, Hopkinson's researches resulted in fundamental contributions to electrical engineering practice, dynamo design and alternating current machine theory. In making a critical study of the Edison dynamo he developed the principle of the magnetic circuit, a concept also arrived at by Gisbert Kapp around the same time. Hopkinson's improvement of the Edison dynamo by reducing the length of the field magnets almost doubled its output. In 1890, in addition to-his consulting practice, Hopkinson accepted a post as the first Professor of Electrical Engineering and Head of the Siemens laboratory recently established at King's College, London. Although he was not involved in lecturing, the position gave him the necessary facilities and staff and student assistance to continue his researches. Hopkinson was consulted on many proposals for electric traction and electricity supply, including schemes in London, Manchester, Liverpool and Leeds. He also advised Mather and Platt when they were acting as contractors for the locomotives and generating plant for the City and South London tube railway. As early as 1882 he considered that an ideal method of charging for the supply of electricity should be based on a two-part tariff, with a charge related to maximum demand together with a charge for energy supplied. Hopkinson was one the foremost expert witnesses of his day in patent actions and was himself the patentee of over forty inventions, of which the three-wire system of distribution and the series-parallel connection of traction motors were his most successful. Jointly with his brother Edward, John Hopkinson communicated the outcome of his investigations to the Royal Society in a paper entitled "Dynamo Electric Machinery" in 1886. In this he also described the later widely used "back to back" test for determining the characteristics of two identical machines. His interest in electrical machines led him to more fundamental research on magnetic materials, including the phenomenon of recalescence and the disappearance of magnetism at a well-defined temperature. For his work on the magnetic properties of iron, in 1890 he was awarded the Royal Society Royal Medal. He was a member of the Alpine Club and a pioneer of rock climbing in Britain; he died, together with three of his children, in a climbing accident.[br]Principal Honours and DistinctionsFRS 1878. Royal Society Royal Medal 1890. President, Institution of Electrical Engineers 1890 and 1896.Bibliography7 July 1881, British patent no. 2,989 (series-parallel control of traction motors). 27 July 1882, British patent no. 3,576 (three-wire distribution).1901, Original Papers by the Late J.Hopkinson, with a Memoir, ed. B.Hopkinson, 2 vols, Cambridge.Further ReadingJ.Greig, 1970, John Hopkinson Electrical Engineer, London: Science Museum and HMSO (an authoritative account).—1950, "John Hopkinson 1849–1898", Engineering 169:34–7, 62–4.GW -
15 Smeaton, John
SUBJECT AREA: Civil engineering, Mechanical, pneumatic and hydraulic engineering, Steam and internal combustion engines[br]b. 8 June 1724 Austhorpe, near Leeds, Yorkshire, Englandd. 28 October 1792 Austhorpe, near Leeds, Yorkshire, England[br]English mechanical and civil engineer.[br]As a boy, Smeaton showed mechanical ability, making for himself a number of tools and models. This practical skill was backed by a sound education, probably at Leeds Grammar School. At the age of 16 he entered his father's office; he seemed set to follow his father's profession in the law. In 1742 he went to London to continue his legal studies, but he preferred instead, with his father's reluctant permission, to set up as a scientific instrument maker and dealer and opened a shop of his own in 1748. About this time he began attending meetings of the Royal Society and presented several papers on instruments and mechanical subjects, being elected a Fellow in 1753. His interests were turning towards engineering but were informed by scientific principles grounded in careful and accurate observation.In 1755 the second Eddystone lighthouse, on a reef some 14 miles (23 km) off the English coast at Plymouth, was destroyed by fire. The President of the Royal Society was consulted as to a suitable engineer to undertake the task of constructing a new one, and he unhesitatingly suggested Smeaton. Work began in 1756 and was completed in three years to produce the first great wave-swept stone lighthouse. It was constructed of Portland stone blocks, shaped and pegged both together and to the base rock, and bonded by hydraulic cement, scientifically developed by Smeaton. It withstood the storms of the English Channel for over a century, but by 1876 erosion of the rock had weakened the structure and a replacement had to be built. The upper portion of Smeaton's lighthouse was re-erected on a suitable base on Plymouth Hoe, leaving the original base portion on the reef as a memorial to the engineer.The Eddystone lighthouse made Smeaton's reputation and from then on he was constantly in demand as a consultant in all kinds of engineering projects. He carried out a number himself, notably the 38 mile (61 km) long Forth and Clyde canal with thirty-nine locks, begun in 1768 but for financial reasons not completed until 1790. In 1774 he took charge of the Ramsgate Harbour works.On the mechanical side, Smeaton undertook a systematic study of water-and windmills, to determine the design and construction to achieve the greatest power output. This work issued forth as the paper "An experimental enquiry concerning the natural powers of water and wind to turn mills" and exerted a considerable influence on mill design during the early part of the Industrial Revolution. Between 1753 and 1790 Smeaton constructed no fewer than forty-four mills.Meanwhile, in 1756 he had returned to Austhorpe, which continued to be his home base for the rest of his life. In 1767, as a result of the disappointing performance of an engine he had been involved with at New River Head, Islington, London, Smeaton began his important study of the steam-engine. Smeaton was the first to apply scientific principles to the steam-engine and achieved the most notable improvements in its efficiency since its invention by Newcomen, until its radical overhaul by James Watt. To compare the performance of engines quantitatively, he introduced the concept of "duty", i.e. the weight of water that could be raised 1 ft (30 cm) while burning one bushel (84 lb or 38 kg) of coal. The first engine to embody his improvements was erected at Long Benton colliery in Northumberland in 1772, with a duty of 9.45 million pounds, compared to the best figure obtained previously of 7.44 million pounds. One source of heat loss he attributed to inaccurate boring of the cylinder, which he was able to improve through his close association with Carron Ironworks near Falkirk, Scotland.[br]Principal Honours and DistinctionsFRS 1753.Bibliography1759, "An experimental enquiry concerning the natural powers of water and wind to turn mills", Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society.Towards the end of his life, Smeaton intended to write accounts of his many works but only completed A Narrative of the Eddystone Lighthouse, 1791, London.Further ReadingS.Smiles, 1874, Lives of the Engineers: Smeaton and Rennie, London. A.W.Skempton, (ed.), 1981, John Smeaton FRS, London: Thomas Telford. L.T.C.Rolt and J.S.Allen, 1977, The Steam Engine of Thomas Newcomen, 2nd edn, Hartington: Moorland Publishing, esp. pp. 108–18 (gives a good description of his work on the steam-engine).LRD -
16 atractivo
adj.1 attractive, nice-looking, good-looking, inviting.2 personable.m.1 attraction, appeal, charm, grace.2 attractor, attracter.3 attraction, turnon, turn-on.* * *► adjetivo1 attractive, charming, appealing1 attraction, charm, appeal————————1 attraction, charm, appeal* * *1. (f. - atractiva)adj.2. noun m.attraction, appeal* * *1.ADJ attractive2.SM attractiveness, appeal* * *I- va adjetivo attractiveIImasculino charm, attractiveness* * *I- va adjetivo attractiveIImasculino charm, attractiveness* * *atractivo11 = appeal, attractiveness, beauty, allure, drawing power, draw, pull factor, attraction, turn-on.Ex: Indeed, if they are not successful in finding ways of renewing their original purpose and appeal, they are on their way to dissolution and displacement.
Ex: It is therefore one of the librarian's prime tasks to preserve the attractiveness of the stock for as long as possible.Ex: The digital form in which we will send information through the network is one of the beauties of modern technology.Ex: The article is entitled 'The perilous allure of moral imperativism'.Ex: Nearly all librarians were enthusiastic about the drawing power of public access computers in spite of the drawbacks such as theft, noise and crowding.Ex: The draw of earning up to 30 pounds per cadaver without risking life or limb proved too tempting for some of the more barbarous resurrectionists, however, leading them to commit murder.Ex: Unsurprisingly such misuse is triggered by push factors, such as fear of failure, and also pull factors, such as ease of use and the ubiquitous cut and paste.Ex: Subject-type title indexes have two important attractions.Ex: Dr. James Houran discusses the different ways men and women show affection and addresses the top turn-ons and turn-offs with men and women.* atractivo de la novedad = novelty appeal, novelty value.* atractivo físico = physical attractiveness, physical appeal.* atractivo novedoso = novelty appeal.* atractivo sexual = sexiness, mojo, sex appeal.* atractivo visual = visual appeal.* perder el atractivo = lose + Posesivo + allure, lose + Posesivo + savour.atractivo22 = attractive, glamorous, glossy [glossier -comp., glossiest -sup.], inviting, appetising [appetizing, -USA], handsome [handsomer -comp., handsomest -sup.], engaging, dashing, personable, arresting, magnetic, enticing, good looking, winning, appealing, endearing, fancied, sizzling, glam, comely [comelier -comp., comeliest -sup.].Ex: A particularly attractive feature of the notation is the expressiveness of the notation.
Ex: Service is perhaps not a very glamorous concept, but we are nevertheless a service profession = El servicio quizás no es un concepto muy atractivo, pero no obstante somos una profesión dedicada al servicio.Ex: On the other hand, credibility relates less to glossy brochure futuristics than to tested areas of application.Ex: An easy and inviting route to the entrance needs to be unambiguously defined.Ex: This is not a very appetizing thought for anyone who wishes to play a key role in the operations of the library.Ex: All these novels are about young women meeting handsome men, at first disliking them and then discovering that they love them, with the inescapable 'happy ending' which means matrimony in these cases.Ex: The interview went smoothly; the committee was impressed by her knowledge of the current library scene, her enthusiasm, and her engaging personality.Ex: Some unfortunate children grow up as readers of James Bond, of dashing thrillers and the blood-and-guts of crude war stories.Ex: Mr Berman, who is a very personable and enthusiastic librarian, certainly comes across.Ex: It is when speakers have no feeling for pause that their speech seems to burble on without any arresting quality; the club bore is a burbler: he has not learnt the eloquence of silence.Ex: It is the duty of the library staff to make the institution magnetic.Ex: The article 'Library scavenger hunts: a way out of the bewilderness' describes the use of library scavenger hunts to teach high school and college students research strategies and to make library use both enticing and enriching.Ex: Our library and some others have prevailed upon a local vendor to prepare good looking, durable packaging for cassettes which makes them perfectly accommodative to the ordinary bookshelves.Ex: Basically it is more tangible and exciting for retailers to develop new products, decorate stores, design Web sites, and create winning advertisements than it is for them to struggle to set prices that will mean profits.Ex: The author offers some suggestions, somewhat 'tongue in cheek', to make the game more appealing for spectators.Ex: Frequently the youngest child takes on the role of the mascot; he acts cute, mischievous, and endearing.Ex: The convention failed to reach an agreement on any of the more fancied candidates.Ex: He had a sizzling, electric stage presence.Ex: Ponytails are becoming glam, says the New York Times.Ex: He went in the tavern wearing an eye patch, crying 'ahoy, matey!' and eying the comely wenches.* de un modo atractivo = appealingly.* hacer atractivo = endear.* parecer atractivo = look + attractive.* poco atractivo = off-putting, unattractive, unglamorous, uninviting, unappealing.* resultar atractivo = prove + attractive.* ser atractivo = look + attractive, be popular in appeal.* sin atractivo = unattractive.* * *attractivetiene mucho atractivo she's very charminges feo, ignorante, totalmente sin atractivos he's ugly, ignorant, he doesn't have a single redeeming feature o there isn't a single good thing about himel mayor atractivo de la ciudad the city's main attraction o appealla oferta no tiene ningún atractivo para mí the offer doesn't attract me o appeal to me in the least, I don't find the offer at all attractive* * *
atractivo 1◊ -va adjetivo
attractive
atractivo 2 sustantivo masculino
el mayor atractivo de la ciudad the city's main attraction o appeal
atractivo,-a
I adjetivo attractive, appealing
II sustantivo masculino attraction, appeal
' atractivo' also found in these entries:
Spanish:
aliciente
- atractiva
- duende
- encanto
- escultural
- flamante
- graciosa
- gracioso
- irresistible
- magnetismo
- mayor
- sexy
- simpatía
- sugestiva
- sugestivo
- tenerse
- arrastre
- bien
- bueno
- desmejorado
- embrujo
- hechizo
English:
appeal
- appealing
- attraction
- attractive
- comely
- desirable
- dishy
- engaging
- enticing
- flair
- glamorous
- homely
- inviting
- lure
- plain
- prepossessing
- selling point
- sex-appeal
- sexiness
- unappealing
- unattractive
- unattractiveness
- endearing
- fetching
- uninviting
- unprepossessing
* * *atractivo, -a♦ adjattractive♦ nm[de persona] attractiveness, charm; [de cosa] attraction;tener atractivo to be attractive;su rostro tiene un atractivo especial her face has a special charm;tu plan tiene muchos atractivos your plan has a lot of points in its favour;tiene el atractivo añadido de ser gratis it has the added attraction o advantage of being freeatractivo sexual sex appeal* * *I adj attractiveII m appeal, attraction* * *atractivo, -va adj: attractiveatractivo nm: attraction, appeal, charm* * *atractivo1 adj attractiveatractivo2 n1. (cosa que atrae) attraction2. (interés) appeal -
17 Espace
The original European "monospace" vehicle, first produced in 1984 byRenault. The initial concept for the Espace was actually conceived in the Rootes/Chrysler design facility in Coventry, England; this facility was associated with Chrysler's French subsidiary, Matra-Simca. When Chrysler sold their UK operations to Peugeot, the latter were not interested in the monospace project, so Matra teamed up with Renault, who eventually went ahead with the project and launched what has since become one of the company's flagship models.Dictionnaire Français-Anglais. Agriculture Biologique > Espace
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18 Thomson, Sir William, Lord Kelvin
[br]b. 26 June 1824 Belfast, Ireland (now Northern Ireland)d. 17 December 1907 Largs, Scotland[br]Irish physicist and inventor who contributed to submarine telegraphy and instrumentation.[br]After education at Glasgow University and Peterhouse, Cambridge, a period of study in France gave Thomson an interest in experimental work and instrumentation. He became Professor of Natural Philosophy at Glasgow in 1846 and retained the position for the rest of his career, establishing the first teaching laboratory in Britain.Among his many contributions to science and engineering was his concept, introduced in 1848, of an "absolute" zero of temperature. Following on from the work of Joule, his investigations into the nature of heat led to the first successful liquefaction of gases such as hydrogen and helium, and later to the science of low-temperature physics.Cable telegraphy gave an impetus to the scientific measurement of electrical quantities, and for many years Thomson was a member of the British Association Committee formed in 1861 to consider electrical standards and to develop units; these are still in use. Thomson first became Scientific Adviser to the Atlantic Telegraph Company in 1857, sailing on the Agamemnon and Great Eastern during the cable-laying expeditions. He invented a mirror galvanometer and more importantly the siphon recorder, which, used as a very sensitive telegraph receiver, provided a permanent record of signals. He also laid down the design parameters of long submarine cables and discovered that the conductivity of copper was greatly affected by its purity. A major part of the success of the Atlantic cable in 1866 was due to Thomson, who received a knighthood for his contribution.Other instruments he designed included a quadrant electrostatic voltmeter to measure high voltages, and his "multi-cellular" instrument for low voltages. They could be used on alternating or direct current and were free from temperature errors. His balances for precision current measurement were widely used in standardizing laboratories.Thomson was a prolific writer of scientific papers on subjects across the whole spectrum of physics; between 1855 and 1866 he published some 110 papers, with a total during his life of over 600. In 1892 he was raised to the peerage as Baron Kelvin of Largs. By the time of his death he was looked upon as the "father" of British physics, but despite his outstanding achievements his later years were spent resisting change and progress.[br]Principal Honours and DistinctionsKnighted 1866. Created Lord Kelvin of Largs 1892. FRS 1851. President, Royal Society 1890–4. An original member of the Order of Merit 1902. President, Society of Telegraph Engineers 1874. President, Institution of Electrical Engineers 1889 and 1907. Royal Society Royal Medal 1856, Copley Medal 1883.Bibliography1872, Reprints of Papers on Electrostatics and Magnetism, London; 1911, Mathematical and Physical Papers, 6 vols, Cambridge (collections of Thomson's papers).Further ReadingSilvanus P.Thompson, 1910, The Life of William Thomson, Baron Kelvin of Largs, 2 vols, London (an uncritical biography).D.B.Wilson, 1987, Kelvin and Stokes: A Comparative Study in Victorian Physics, Bristol (provides a present-day commentary on all aspects of Thomson's work).J.G.Crowther, 1962, British Scientists of the 19th Century, London, pp. 199–257 (a short critical biography).GWBiographical history of technology > Thomson, Sir William, Lord Kelvin
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